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Self-respect, like dignity and integrity, plays a key role in the way we shape 
our lives yet it remains an underanalysed concept.  Questions like, 'Could I 
live with myself if I did x?' or fears like the fear of failure address at some 
level the effect that x or failure may have on our self-respect.  We all have 
levels to which we think we will not sink, and although these lower limits are 
not always determined by considerations concerning our self-respect, such 
considerations will often play a crucial role in defining what we will strive 
not to be or try to become.  Self-respect is something that we are loath to give 
up even in the harshest of circumstances and quick to pursue even at the cost 
of great  toil. Self-respect has at least two components.  The first component is 
connected with a person's conception of herself as having moral value, 
regardless of her reasons for viewing herself in this way.  Sticks and stones 
cannot possess this general component of self-respect but Kantians, 
Utilitarians, Christians and Buddhists can all equally well achieve it.  This 
aspect of self-respect is essentially a state of mind.  But self-respect must be 
connected with more than what one believes; it must also be dependent upon 
what one does. Thus, the second component of self-respect is connected with 
a person's success at achieving or striving to achieve goals which she finds 
valuable.  The measure of this success will depend upon the person's 
particular talents and abilities, such that success for the individual in activity 
x may not coincide with social conceptions of successful x-ing.  For example, 
a tone deaf person might respect herself in virtue of being able to hold a tune, 
but she would not ipso facto be a great singer. 
 
This outline of self-respect occurs at what could be called the meta-level.  It 
gives a general and abstract description of the structural features of self-
respect but remains silent on the question of how potential self-respecters 
should conceive of themselves as morally valuable, for example, or what kind 
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of activity counts as striving to achieve a valued goal.  Each selfrespecter will 
evince these aspects of self-respect in a way that depends on their central 
values.  In addressing my puzzle about self-respect - for reasons which will 
become clear - I will take it as a virtue of any proposed answer that it remains 
at this meta-level without making reference to any very specific values which 
need not be shared by all self-respecters.  
 
The puzzle I want to focus on can be illustrated by considering the following 
cases.  First, take Eric Cantona, the Manchester United striker.  Let us assume 
that Eric conceives of himself as morally valuable, performs well according to 
his personal standards for all those activities he values, and has no hidden 
failures or secret despair.  Given this it is clear that, love or loathe him, Eric 
has self-respect.  
 
Second, consider the Stepford Wives.  Ignoring the fact that the Stepford 
Wives in the film were automata, let us stipulate that these are women who 
perform well at all the activities forming the core of their conception of the 
good; they are maestros at washing up, masters of cake baking and geniuses 
at keeping their husbands fed, clothed and sexually satisfied.  As one of the 
Stepford husbands in the film says of his Wife, 'She cooks as good as she 
looks'.  Let us also assume that they conceive of themselves as morally 
valuable.    
 
Given this it should follow that Eric and the Stepford Wives respect 
themselves to more or less the same degree.  They all conceive of themselves 
as morally valuable and are all extremely successful in pursuing their 
personal goals; Eric is one of the best Premier League players, and no-one 
touches the Stepford Wives when it comes to housekeeping.  But do we really 
want to make this unqualified claim?  I would be reluctant to, for although 
the Stepford Wives may have some self-respect my intuitions are that they do 
not have as much as Eric.  The puzzle I will examine is why we are reluctant 
to treat the Stepford Wives as exemplary self-respecters when, prima facie, 
they have many of the attributes and achievements which we normally take 
to be indicative of self-respect.  There must be something about the Stepford 
Wives that Eric lacks which explains this unease.  In trying to pinpoint the 
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difference between them I hope to shed some general light on the complex 
concept of self-respect. 
 
At first sight there are three ways to explain the difference between Eric and 
the Stepford Wives.  First, one could focus on what they do.  Second, one 
could concentrate on the extent to which they exercise certain capacities.  And 
third, one could address the nature of their preferences.  Although none of 
these approaches is acceptable, I will briefly address each of them so as to 
give a sense of how thorny the problem of the Stepford Wives is.  
 
The most obvious way to explain the difference between Eric and the 
Stepford Wives is simply to claim that footballing is intrinsically and 
objectively more worthy of respect than housekeeping, and thus Eric respects 
himself more than the Stepford Wives because what he does gives him more 
objective reason to respect himself than what they do.  This is an undesirable 
approach to the problem; self-respect does not necessarily depend upon the 
value that others place on your personal achievements, and thus the fact that 
we ourselves may think that housekeeping is inferior to footballing does not 
explain why we think that a group of housekeepers respect themselves less 
than a footballer.  I believe it better to devote your life to music than to God, 
but I would not automatically conclude that all successful pianists respect 
themselves more than a community of chaste Carmelites.  
 
The second approach is to claim that autonomy is a necessary condition for 
self-respect and Eric has, while the Stepford Wives lack, a high level of 
autonomy.  So the difference between them is the degree to which they 
exercise their capacity for autonomy.  
 
The main problem with this approach is that positing autonomy as a 
necessary condition for self-respect, regardless of whether the person in 
question values autonomy or not, is excessively chauvinistic in so far as it 
represents only one conception of self-respect that is dependent upon one 
specific set of values, that is, the values associated with autonomy. For 
example, independence, self-control and courage.  Those conceptions of 
autonomy which are not associated with specific values like these lie outside 
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the scope of the criticism.‚  One of the pre -analytical hallmarks of self-respect 
is that all sorts of people with diverse characters, capacities and values can 
equally well respect themselves.  Positing autonomy as necessary for self -
respect makes it the prerogative of those who value autonomy, but any 
plausible analysis of self-respect must reflect the diversity it encompasses.  If 
self-respect is understood as dependent upon the exercise of capacities which 
are not held constant in value across many different perspectives then the 
analysis will be of one conception of self-respect only, rather than of the meta 
-characteristics which shed real light on this concept.  
 
The third approach is to claim that a person cannot have self -respect unless 
the preferences she acts upon in pursuing valued goals are authentic.1 Thus, 
authentic preference formation is a necessary condition for self-respect.  One 
prominent account of authentic preferences defines them as objectively 
contributing to the development of a person as a flourishing human being 
according to an Aristotelian conception, but one could equally well adopt 
other conceptions of human flourishing to elucidate authenticity.  One could 
argue, then, that Eric's preferences for football contribute to his flourishing as 
an individual whereas the Stepford Wives' preferences for catering for their 
husbands to the exclusion of all else do not and thus Eric has, and the 
Stepford Wives lack, self-respect.  
 
The authenticity based approach shares the basic flaw of the other two 
approaches; it requires that one describe a necessary condition for self-respect 
in terms of one very specific - in this case Aristotelian - set of values.  Any 
analysis of self -respect which proceeds like this cannot reflect the way in 
which self-respect transcends value differences.  
 
                                                
1 Cf. Jean Hampton, 'Selflessness And The Loss Of Self' in Altruism eds. Paul, 
Miller and Paul (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
2  Cf. Thomas E. Hill Jnr., ‘Servility and Self-Respect’, Autonomy and Self-
Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 4-18. Hill's 
account differs from mine in that he defines servility in terms of a failure to 
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It might seem here that the attempt to address the puzzle of the Stepford 
Wives at the meta-level without invoking specific values is futile.  In what 
follows I hope to give a satisfactory answer to the puzzle which shows that 
this is not the case.  This answer will further illustrate how self-respect 
depends more on how one behaves rather than what one values, and 
illuminate the general structure of the life of a self-respecting person.  
 
So exactly what is wrong with the Stepford Wives?  What is it that they have 
or do which would explain our reluctance to point them out to children as 
self-respecting role models?    
 
A clue to explaining this reluctance can be found by examining why the 
Stepford Wives so assiduously perform their household tasks.  Their desire to 
please their husbands is generated - at least initially - by a fear of the censure 
or criticisms which they will receive if they fail to keep house well.  When the 
primary motivation for an action is fear of this sort, the fear that one will be in 
some way punished if one fails to meet standards set for one by others then, I 
submit, that action cannot serve as a basis for self-respect.  
 
This does not imply that the self-respecting person will not fear failure or 
attempt to avoid criticism per se.  As already noted, one of the things we fear 
most is the loss of self-respect, the failure to succeed by our own lights.  But 
fearing self -criticism is distinct from fearing the criticisms of others, even 
though these two worries are often intimately connected.  People sometimes 
internalise the criticisms of others and develop a self-attitude which blinds 
them to their personal successes.  One difference between Eric and the 
Stepford Wives can be found in the explanations we give of their respective 
fears of failure.  Eric's self-criticisms are dependent upon his failure according 
to what he counts as success, whereas the Stepford Wives' self -criticisms are 
dependent on a desire to please their spouses, originally inculcated in them 
by a fear of incurring the censure of their husbands in virtue of what they 
count as success for their Wives.  
 
We are now more easily able to pinpoint what is worrying about the Stepford 
Wives and their self-respect.  The reason why they fear their husbands' 
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censure is their perception of them as their moral superiors, as worth more 
than they are, and they desire to promote their husbands' interests in virtue of 
this belief.  A person who acts in this way is subservient, and it is the 
probable subservience of the Stepford Wives that distinguishes their case 
from that of Eric and explains our unease over their claims to self-respect.  In 
general we could claim that when a person promotes the interests of another 
primarily because they believe themselves to be morally inferior to that other 
then they are subservient, and subservience is incompatible with self -respect, 
however one gains it.2 It is compatible with the Stepford Wives' subservience 
that they are also motivated to promote their husbands' interests out of love 
or affection.  Nonetheless, they remain subservient if their primary 
motivation is their perception of themselves as morally inferior to their 
husbands.‚    
 
The claim that subservient activity cannot ground self-respect is harmonious 
with three general, meta-features of self-respect implied by the outline given 
earlier.  First, a person's self -respect is intimately connected with how they 
behave over and above what they believe, and subservience also manifests 
itself in behaviour.  Subservient behaviour, then, cannot ground self -respect.  
Second, self-respect is not an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a matter of 
degree.  One can conceive of oneself as more or less morally valuable and be 
more or less successful at striving to achieve personal goals.  Subservience is 
similarly a matter of degree; more or less of one's actions can be more or less 
subservient.  Third, self-respect is rarely totally absent; a person who 
conceives of themselves as utterly valueless and has never strived to achieve 
any personal goals is hard to picture.  One explanation of why this is difficult 
is now available, that is, that it is extremely hard to be totally subservient; to 
succeed in this all of a person's other-directed actions would have to be 
premised on a conviction of their moral inferiority.  These three claims about 
                                                
2  Cf. Thomas E. Hill Jnr., ‘Servility and Self-Respect’, Autonomy and Self-
Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 4-18. Hill's 
account differs from mine in that he defines servility in terms of a failure to 
appreciate the importance of, or perhaps even to acknowledge the existence 
of, one's rights. 
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self-respect are all intuitively appealing, and it is a virtue of the account of the 
relationship between subservience and self-respect sketched above that it 
reflects them.  
 
This strategy avoids the problems associated with the three approaches 
outlined earlier by importing only a minimum of values into the explanation.  
In pinpointing the source of our worries about the Stepford Wives in their 
probable subservience I have avoided addressing the question of the 
worthiness of housekeeping per se or the Wives' failure to live up to various 
ideals of the good life.  To avoid subservience one must view the other who 
benefits from one's actions as no more valuable than oneself, and this belief is 
compatible with any number of perspectives.  Eric avoids the self-disrespect 
of the Stepford Wives partly by avoiding subservient behaviour, but if his 
footballing successes were primarily motivated by a desire to please his 
dominant wife then this would not be the case.  Alternatively, if the Stepford 
Wives excel at housekeeping but are indifferent to their husbands' commands 
then - at least in keeping house - they avoid subservience.  Subservience has 
been defined in such a way that many different kinds of lives based around 
diverse sets of values can evince a subservient structure.  This account of the 
structure of subservience mirrors the account of the structure of self-respect 
in so far as subservience is not exclusively linked to any one type of life or 
person.  In this way my answer to the puzzle of the Stepford Wives ensures 
that self-respect retains its character as an attitude not dependent upon the 
specifics of what a person holds valuable, but rather dependent upon the way 
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